The Christian community characteristically confesses the constancy of God. But historians of religion know by contrast that the deity Yhwh evolved over time. How might scholars who belong to both these camps negotiate the disconnect? This essay seeks an answer by staging a moment of complementarity between Religionsgeschichte and OT theology. First it considers two cases in which the discourses of each discipline mirror one another by narrating the same event of deity change: Ps 82 and Yhwh's greater mercy through exile. Second, it provides a sampler of two theological ontologies that countenance "holy mutability": the open theism of Terence Fretheim and the evangelical historicism of Eberhard Jüngel. 
"Thou changest not," says the hymn-and yet deities change. This much is a truism of scholarship on the history of religions. Where the Christian community characteristically says to God, "As thou hast been, thou forever wilt be," the historian of religion knows by contrast that the deity Yhwh evolved over time. This creates a disconnect for those members of the theological academy who belong to both camps. The present essay is offered in service to them. It cannot hope fully to resolve so vexed an issue, or even to interest historians of religion who operate without theological commitments. Its aim is more modest: to stage a moment of rapprochement between Religionsgeschichte and a theologically realist version of (Old Testament) theology. Its audience, obviously, will include only scholars for whom such theological realism is pressing.
This proposed moment of complementarity between the two disciplines requires two building blocks. First, the discourses of each discipline must mirror one another. At the level of speech, the two must come into symmetry. As will be seen, this is already hurdle enough, since Religionsgeschichte typically traffics in development and dynamism and theology in eternals and constants ("forever wilt be"). Nonetheless, sometimes theology, too, may speak of deity change; in Karl Barth's words, "there is such a thing as a holy mutability in God."2 The first section below isolates two cases in which sentences of Religionsgeschichte and (OT) theology run parallel by narrating the same events of deity change.
The second building block is ontology. For a theologically realist version of (OT) theology, it is not enough to compare the two disciplines on the formal level only, as if merely to compare the grammars of two research areas. Rather, the present essay must move from discourse to ontology:3 to posit ways in which sentences of (OT) theology, at the point of their parallelism with sentences from Religionsgeschichte, could count as realist; or, nonfictional. Because the discourse of (OT) theology mirrors Religionsgeschichte when narrating deity change, it will be necessary to find examples of theological ontology that can accept "holy mutability." The second section below presents two such ontologies; a sampler, as it were, of theological possibilities preliminary to disciplinary rapprochement. An example from a neighboring discipline will illustrate what is meant in this essay by "discourses running parallel" as well as by "theological realism" (or "nonfictiveness"). Historians write about the religion of Ugarit that its deity, Ba'al, rose to mythological prominence as a reflex of political developments there: "the rise of Ba'al as depicted in the [Ba'al] cycle may reflect the rise of Ba'al's popularity in the city, perhaps due to a change in dynasty."4 Ba'al on this read is a human concept riding the tide of eminently human forces like political succession. Conceptions of Ba'al changed, and contemporary historians frame this change in terms of political turnover.5 Alternately, one must assume that for his Late Bronze Age raconteurs, Ba'al's rise to mythological prominence was the result of Ba'al's own initiative. Ba'al on this read is an agent, as responsible for his own change in status as any enterprising human dynast here below.
Langdon Gilkey once located the difference between the Bible and its modern commentators at the level of syntax: "[T]hough God is the subject of all the verbs of the Bible, Hebrew religious faith and Hebrew minds provide the subjects of all the verbs in modern books on the meaning of the Bible."6 His syntactic observation applies, mutatis mutandis, to the case of Ba'al above. Historians of Ba'al place humans and human forces in the grammatical subject position, while Bronze Age theologians of Ba'al place god(s) in the grammatical subject position. Diagrammatically: These sentences are symmetrical; they name the same deity and narrate the same progression in his status, even as they also place two different agents in the lead grammatical role. The two sentences also narrate a change. They are not stative, referring to an enduring condition (like saying, "Ba'al is mighty," e.g., KTU³ 1.6 vi 17, 19, 20), but dynamic. The condition resulting from the narrated action is different from that at which it began. Historians and theologians of Yhwh speak about him with the same syntactic markers that distinguish historians from devotees of Ba'al. These two discourses also characteristically place different agencies in the subject position. (OT) theology fronts God as subject, whereas Religionsgeschichte fronts humans and human forces. But these two disciplines also occasionallyarguably-describe the same events of deity change. In this sense, they "run parallel," discursively.
The example of Ba'al is also instructive with regard to the meaning of "(non) fictiveness." Presumably the first author(s) and audiences of the mythic texts about Ba'al and his rise to kingship took them as nonfictional. It is impossible to know how an Ugaritian would have answered questions about the relation of a mythic text to the (extra-textual) deity whose exploits it celebrates. But one can safely assume that the mythic texts about Ba'al, whatever else their function, were seen as telling truthfully about a deity active in the world "out there" and not, as it were, alive only in imagination for the duration of the texts' recital.7
For its first authors and audiences, too, OT texts were presumably taken as nonfictional, in this general sense.8 But this difference obtains: no devotees of Ba'al exist today who consider sentences about Ba'al nonfictional; contemporary students of the Ba'al cycle today regard it as artefactual and decidedly not realist. We do not expect to encounter the deity Ba'al outside of our reading experience. This is not so for the OT. At least some forms of (OT) theology take sentences about Yhwh as, in some sense, nonfictional: indicating or evoking an extra-textual being, i.e., the Lord. Some of us do, indeed, expect to encounter this God outside of our reading experience.9 This is the constructive form of (OT) theology with which the present essay concerns itself.10
Discursive Case Studies
To reach a moment of rapprochement between Religionsgeschichte and (OT) theology, sentences from their corpora must come into symmetry: by describing the same event of deity change. But it is difficult to discern if and when (OT) theology and Religionsgeschichte do, in fact, deal with the same happenstance. For example, scholarship on the history of Israelite religions speaks often of the emergence of monotheism. Many sentences in such scholarship describe a change that took place in the conception of Yhwh over time (with human forces as their subject):
The innovative centralization of national worship was also part of the process leading to monotheistic Yahwism, as it encouraged a single national deity and discouraged local manifestations of deity. The royal unification of national life-both political and religious-helped to achieve political and cultic centralization.11 9 Some readers might object to this formulation, of "encountering Yhwh extra-textually." If, in Lindbeck's famous axiom, "Scripture absorbs the world," no encounter with Yhwh (or anything else) ought really be "extra-textual." I sympathize with this perspective, but at the same time aspire to a realist ontology. An example is found in the work of Eberhard Jüngel, about whose opus John Webster writes, "it recommends a 'realist' account of our knowledge of God, in which human thinking about God is brought about not so much by human inventiveness as by an initiative beyond itself" ("Jesus' Speech, God' Or, more diagrammatically:
Syntax 1: Nationalization [human subject] helped to make Yhwh the sole deity of Israelite religion.
But for the most part, the OT preserves no memory of this sea-change from a plurality of deities to only one. Perhaps only one text narrates a change from the one to the other, representing the theological stop motion footage between, say, the henotheism of Exodus and the monotheism of Second Isaiah.12 The enigmatic Ps 82 thus reads:
I said, "You are gods, And all of you are sons of the Most High. "Nevertheless you will die like men And fall like any one of the princes." (NASB)
The speaker-apparently God-utters performative speech. Its effect is to demote the gods addressed from divinity to mortality.13 The resultant situation is one of divine singularity. Yhwh-here Elohim-alone is divinely immortal. The whole can be restated in syntax running parallel to the religion-historical sentence above.
Syntax 2: Yhwh [divine subject] demoted the other gods for failing to observe justice, making himself the sole deity.
In an extended and shadowy sense, the above sentences concern the "same" event. Even if the second, theological sentence is not time-stamped in the same way as the first, the two both speak of a progression in Yhwh's status from being one among several gods to being the one and only. They also narrate a dynamic change rather than speaking statively. They are, then, symmetrical, even as they place differing agents in the grammatical lead role. Another and perhaps stronger example when the discourses of Religionsgeschichte and (OT) theology run parallel concerns the impact of defeat on the personality of Yhwh. Some recent research in both the history of religions and (OT) theology concurs that national defeat reshaped the personality of Yhwh, turning him towards unprecedented mercy.14 From the religionsgeschichtliche side, this claim can be summed up like so:
1.
Yhwh On the basis of comparative evidences, some scholars have reversed this sequence. What Eichrodt takes an interposition, i.e., Yhwh as a characteristic state deity, this research interprets as primordial. What he sees as the most basic feature of Israelite faith, i.e., the possibility that Yhwh could terminate his relation to Israel, this research reads as a prophetic innovation. No one before Amos or Hosea had imagined that Yhwh could be so wrathful as to destroy his own king and country. Conversely, no other Levantine theology had had opportunity to proclaim the mercy of its deity so extremely as the OT prophetic books. Because other Levantine deities always and ultimately supported the societies over which they were patron, they could never have promised to reconstitute a society like Yhwh did. Nor did they have need of consoling a disenfranchised people, like Yhwh did. In a very real way, then, the experiences of devastation and exile made Yhwh more merciful than he had that the canonical sentence and the religionsgeschichtliche sentence describe the "same" event. These kinds of theological statements can be diagrammed as follows:
Syntax 2: Yhwh [divine subject] acted in wrath to destroy (the Israelite and Judean states), but then chose to be yet more merciful than he had ever been before.
Several other observations about the above theological sentence will become relevant in due course. First, the sentence above contains an irreversible linearity. God's wrath and mercy are not (here) two gnomic attributes, but two points on a historical line. Second, the sentence narrates a sequence of divine decisions that seem to work oppositely. If the second decision had been effective initially, the first divine decision would not have occurred. The two acts are thus genuinely "bipolar."26 Third, this means that there is an ἐφάπαξ quality to the whole sequence.27 In the OT, Yhwh's mercy that follows the exile does not threaten to regress back to wrath. Despite the fact that threats of divine wrath and judgment through exile stand in the canon, their force seems largely retrospective; they do not act as a conditional clause asterisked onto the grand prophetic promises of resettlement in the land and renewed national life.28 The theological sentence above is irreversibly linear, genuinely bipolar, and ἐφάπαξ. 
Ontological Case Studies
The section above sampled two cases in which the discourses of Religionsgeschichte and (OT) theology parallel one another by narrating the same event of deity change. This kind of demonstration is necessary for showing the complementarity of Religionsgeschichte and (OT) theology; each discipline's speech must sometimes mirror the other's. However, this comparison remains at the level of discourse only. As such, it cannot claim truly to stage a rapprochement between Religionsgeschichte and a theologically realist version of (OT) theology. Proposing a moment of correspondence between these two requires that the present essay also consider ontology: it must answer the question of how dynamic theological sentences like the one above about Yhwh's decision for greater mercy can qualify as nonfictional.
A major difficulty for this task is the fact that classical theology does not underwrite the nonfictiveness of dynamic theological sentences. To the contrary, it mostly empties such sentences of their claim to nonfictiveness. Exegetes within the Jewish and Christian traditions have by necessity negotiated sentences from the OT that speak of divine repentance or divine mutability. But because of their commitment to a doctrine of divine immutability, they have often given only a propadeutic place to dynamic scriptural language for God.29 Such rhetoric may yet instruct and edify, but it is not to be "crudely ascribed to divine things."30 In effect, these statements become a kind of fiction: biblical descriptions of God as mutable live only in the imagination for the duration of their contemplation, and do not correspond (much) to any divine referent. They are not wholly fictional, since they still name the extratextual being, Yhwh. But at the same time, their referential power is almost wholly circumscribed.31 29 "Propadeutic" in the sense of, preparing its audience to move on to more refined, less pictorial forms of contemplation. So Aquinas: "For the minds of those given the revelation are not allowed to remain arrested with the images. This line of thinking, whatever its general merits, greatly reduces the potential complementarity between sentences of Religionsgeschichte and sentences of theology. It renders their parallelism formalistic only. Their discourses may mirror one another, but at the level of ontology, the two disciplines remain oblique.
Perhaps this situation is satisfactory to its various constituencies. But the present essay seeks a moment of rapprochement between the two disciplines, which converge while describing an event of deity change. Because of its concern for a theologically realist (OT) theology, this means looking for theological ontologies that can countenance "holy mutability." The section below sketches two theological ontologies that do not limit the referential power of dynamic theological sentences but enable them to count as nonfictional. The first ontological case study describes the open theism of Terence Fretheim; the second describes the "evangelical historicism" of Eberhard Jüngel.32 Both of these brief overviews refer back to the case study of Yhwh's greater mercy through defeat and exile.
Open Theism: Terence Fretheim
Terence Fretheim's writings are pervasively theocentric; the being of God and God's relation to the world are focal points of his corpus. From his 1984 book on The Suffering of God to his 2005 God and the World in the Old Testament, he has treated widely of theological language about divine mutability, and affirmed its correspondence with the extra-textual being of God: "To speak of God as the one who repents, with the basic idea of reversal and change, does have some basic points of continuity with the way God actually relates to the world."33
The core of Fretheim's conviction about the God-world relationship is that "the world is not only affected by God; God is also affected by the world."34 One of Fretheim's bywords is integrity. God "enters into a relationship of integrity nonfictiveness of relatively too much OT literature-if, on the whole, the OT is to be considered nonfictional. 32 These theologians were selected because their works are thoroughly theocentric; ontologically realist; and alternative to classical theology. They are also both Lutheran and notably indebted to Luther's theologia crucis. with the world . . . and both the world and God are affected by that linkage." 35 The integrity of God's relationship to creation entails divine affectability: divine openness to input from creatures endowed with autonomy. It also entails divine temporality: "God is in time," such that there is a before and after in the divine person.36 Who God is later differs from who God was formerly.
Two important qualifications on this claim for "holy mutability" are quickly apparent in Fretheim's writings: one, God's affectability by the world is selfundertaken, "a free act of self-limitation."37 God does not stand in a relationship of affectability eo ipso. Fretheim here distinguishes himself from process theism, according to which God grows through God's history with the worldnot by God's choice, but essentially, as a function of who God is from the outset.38 Second, God's affectability is also limited by the constancy of God's purpose. God is not capricious. For Fretheim, God's will to save is steadfast and enduring. 39 With regard to the case study above, Fretheim's theological ontology would allow for statements about Yhwh's decision for greater mercy after the destruction of exile to obtain-nonfictionally. In fact, much of what Fretheim writes of the flood story in Gen 6-9 applies just as well to the cataclysmic divine judgment of exile and Yhwh's changed resolve thereafter. As with the flood, so with the experience(s) of exile: Yhwh first acts (though sorrowfully) to effect destruction. After punishment has run its course, Yhwh then appears to reverse course: Yhwh promises not to do again what Yhwh did at first. The very same human condition that at first moved Yhwh to judgement (see Gen 6:5) at the end of the flood story (see Gen 8:21) moves Yhwh to an act of divine self-limitation. Yhwh promises never again comprehensively to destroy. God's history in the flood is also irreversibly linear, genuinely bipolar, and ἐφάπαξ. Thus Fretheim:
What God does here recharacterizes the divine relation to the world. God softens the workings of divine judgment and promises an orderly cosmos for the continuation of life. God will never do this again! God is the one who has changed between the beginning and the end of the flood, not human beings. 40 Fretheim's theological ontology permits a rapprochement between sentences of Religionsgeschichte and dynamic theological sentences, because Fretheim posits a view of God that ensures the nonfictiveness of dynamic theological language. The two diagrammed sentences could each stand as nonfictional:
Syntax 1: Because of the destruction of the Israelite and Judean states, OT prophets [human subject] imagined Yhwh as more wrathful than any other patron deities; but they then also imagined Yhwh yet more mercifully Syntax 2: Yhwh acted in wrath to destroy (the Israelite and Judean states), but then chose [divine subject] to be yet more merciful than he had ever been before. Doubtless some readers will quail at Fretheim's theological ontology. See, for example, Brevard Childs's scandalized reaction: "[Fretheim says] God is unchangeable in certain respects, but God changes in the light of his relationship with the world. My initial response is to dismiss this [idea] as an egregious intrusion of modern American Process Theology!"41 The heart of Childs's (and others') objection to Fretheim's theological ontology is the threat it poses to divine freedom. Childs is concerned that Fretheim's ontology "strip[s God] of sovereignty."42 To which Fretheim would reply, God has exercised divine freedom-precisely by choosing to enter into relationship of ongoing reciprocity with the world. 43 The goal of the present essay is not, however, finally to adjudicate between the two theological ontologies on offer here, but only to provide a sampler for scholars interested in bridging the disconnect between their two languages, of theological realism and evolutionary religion-history.
Evangelical Historicism: Eberhard Jüngel
Nonetheless, for those readers that share Childs's concern, it may be possible to have their theological cake and eat it, too. There is another school of modern theology that protects divine freedom while also offering many of the same advantages of Fretheim's open theism. For the purposes of the present essay, it enables dynamic theological sentences to qualify as fully nonfictional. Like Fretheim, it may then offer a moment of rapprochement between the sundered dialects of Religionsgeschichte and (OT) theology. This theological school is what R. Michael Allen calls "evangelical historicism."44 Allen's theological tag is idiosyncratic, but it helpfully summarizes the two lead features of the theological ontology in question.
The being of God in such theological discourse is "evangelical" in the sense of taking the "the gospel story" of Jesus Christ, and especially of his death and resurrection, as its lodestar. Eberhard Jüngel writes of evangelical theology that it "does not desire to be lacking in presuppositions, but rather implies certain decisions in its approach."45 One of the already-made methodological decisions of evangelical theology is that "the task of thinking God as God is steered by the reality of the biblical texts,"46 and not just any biblical texts, but especially those that speak of the "unique relationship between God and Jesus Christ."47 This means that, like Fretheim, evangelical historicism takes the Bible as its basic working material for thinking through the identity of God. Unlike Fretheim, though, evangelical historicism privileges the biblical texts that rehearse the story of Jesus Christ. That story Jüngel frames especially in terms of "God's involvement with nothingness."48 Second, the being of God in this theological discourse is "historicist": in Allen's words, evangelical historicism "construe [ Second, and most importantly for satisfying Childs's objection, evangelical historicism differs from Fretheim in the unconditionality of its divine freedom. For Fretheim, God's own future is open, i.e., conditioned by the contingencies of world history. There are yet-unrealized potentialities inherent in the divine being. For evangelical historicism, God's future is not open. God is determined wholly by the historical event of Jesus Christ. In this way, evangelical historicism maintains with classical theism the doctrine of God as an actus purus, or pure act.58 There is no "raw material" in God awaiting further stimulus to become what it will be. Rather, "the eternal event in which God chose to be 'God for us' [in Jesus Christ] is, at the same time, the eternal event in which God gave (and continues to give) to himself his own being."59 The history of Jesus Christ exhaustively reveals and realizes whatever "possibilities" are thinkable of God's being.
Both these lines of reasoning appear to compromise the nonfictiveness of dynamic theological sentences excerpted from the OT. If dynamic theological sentences from the OT must be "re-routed" through the gospel story of Jesus Christ, this seemingly eviscerates their realism. If God's being does not change in response to the unfolding events of history, this seems to empty sentences about divine mutability of their referential purchase. Nonetheless, there may be room yet in this theological school for dynamic theological sentences drawn from the OT to count as nonfictional. For evangelical historicism, whatever "holy mutability" pertains to God must first of all describe Jesus Christ. This kind of theological ontology would countenance theological language about Yhwh's greater mercy through exile insofar as it could construe it as an analogical echo, a repetition from beforehand, of God's own realized passability (i.e., passion) in the death and resurrection of Jesus.
In other words: if the above diagrammed theological sentence about Yhwh's greater mercy through exile can be read as a proleptic paraphrase of the gospel over the question of the unity of the Old and New Testament that it became possible to transcend some of the classic Christocentric weaknesses in Barth's theology. As Seitz would say: we do know something about God other than through Jesus of Nazareth, Jesus Christ. We know something about the God of Israel even as this knowledge is elevated by the man Jesus" (Metaphysics and speak of God's mutability. There is a change-a change of events, from the first to the second, which is proper to God's own being. 63 Second, the opposition between the two stages of God's history is genuinely bipolar. God is responsible for nothingness, even as God then overcomes it. God establishes nothingness: in Jüngel's argument, "God gives nothingness a place within being by taking it on himself. In that God identified himself with the dead Jesus, he located nothingness within the divine life."64 This means that the first part of Jüngel's sentence above no less than the second owes to a divine decision-as with the OT theological sentence. But by the same token, God gives nothingness a place only so as to determine it, creatively: that is, to overcome it. Again, Jüngel: "In bearing annihilation in himself, God proves himself to be the victor over nothingness." The opposition between God and nothingness is genuine, just as was the opposition of God's wrath through exile and God's greater mercy.
Third and finally, as God's history, the history of Jesus Christ is unrepeatable and unique: utterly ἐφάπαξ. In Barth's phrase, God is actus purus et singularis; "God's being-in-act is a being in a 'particular event'-an event whose singularity consists in the fact that its basis is different from all other events in history."65 Because of these convergences between Jüngel's gospel summary and the dynamic theological sentence from the OT, evangelical historicism may offer a way to underwrite the nonfictiveness of statements about divine mutability-such as Yhwh's greater mercy through exile-while also maintaining divine freedom. In this way, evangelical historicism affords a moment of rapprochement between Religionsgeschichte and theological ontology.
For those like Fretheim who see a divine word "bound up . . . with every reported word of God in the OT"66 rather than available first and foremost in Jesus Christ, insuring divine freedom in Jüngel's way may come at too high an interpretive cost: namely, collapsing the testimony of the OT prophets into the story of Jesus. Again, the object of the present essay is only to lay out theological routes that lie open to scholars who wish to see the two disciplines of Religionsgeschichte and (OT) theology momentarily align-and not ultimately to arbitrate which route is more secure. The results of such an essay will hardly persuade the historian of religion who does not identify with Christian language about God. But for those who do, it is hoped that the present essay opens fresh possibilities for resolving the disconnect they perceive between their two professions.
Conclusion
A line from an old hymn serves as the epigraph of the present essay. A theological excerpt, it addresses God in second person to hymn God's constancy. It sits rudely juxtaposed with the essay's opening claim that deity change is a stockin-trade of historical scholarship. Since many of us in the theological academy live bilingually in both these forms of discourse, code-switching between the two syntaxes that Gilkey specifies, the present essay explores points along which these two discourses run parallel. Divine changelessness in the hymn openly conflicts with the deity change of Religionsgeschichte. But this essay pursued a moment of complementarity by drawing out the dynamism latent within such an (OT) theological statement: in terms of the hymn, that latency resides in the linearity of the "morning by morning" and the novelty of the "new mercies."67
